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DRAFT SUMMARY OUTLINE

OD/ORR: [REDACTED] gkg/5001 (25 Feb 66)

Record and Potential of Air Attacks in Obtaining
U.S. Objectives in Vietnam

I. Rolling Thunder.

A. What it did.

Physical damage -- military and civilian.

Casualties -- military and civilian.

B. Effect on North Vietnam.

Repair Costs, including a discussion of what is likely to be repaired during the duration of the conflict, and a discussion of who pays the ultimate bill.

Flow of supplies and requirements of the VC and PAVN forces.

New LOC construction in Vietnam and Laos.

Percent of labor force tied up in repair operations, dispersal facilities, manning AA guns, etc.

C. Effect on North Vietnam's Allies.

Political attitudes of individual Communist countries.

Military and economic aid from the USSR in 1965.

Military and economic aid from Communist China in 1965.

II. Why the Rolling Thunder Program was Relatively Ineffective.

A. The Importance of North Vietnam to the Military Effort in the South.

Subsistence agricultural economy, small industrial sector.

Source of manpower.

Direction of insurgency in the South.

North Vietnam as a logistics funnel.

B. Rolling Thunder Target Selection in Retrospect.

Principles of target selection.

Effect of "sanctuary" areas on effectiveness.

The LOC target system.

III. Can Air Attack have a Significant Effect in Helping to Achieve U.S. Objectives.

A. Targets in North Vietnam of Military Importance (apart from those whose neutralization is essential to the control of NV air space).

POL (including location and approximate sortie requirements).

Cement (same).

Ammo dumps (same).

The insurgency control center (same).

Skilled manpower.

B. The LOC Target System.

The importance of Haiphong and other ports and their vulnerability to mining.

The rail lines to China.

Coastal and inland waterways.

Highways in DRV

D. Conclusions. ^{Lags} Shipping

Estimate that air attacks in the North can play a significant role, particularly under drastically revised ground rules both with respect to target selection and rules of engagement.

A continuation of the program of 1965, even if the weight of attack were stepped up, it is likely to be virtually ineffective.

*The "Hostage" Target System
Steel, machine Bldg, etc.
The Korean experience*

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Importance of the level of combat in South Vietnam -- the main point is that military ground action and the bombing are really complimentary means of bringing pressure. To the extent that it is possible to escalate the level of fighting in the South requirements for ammunition will be significantly increased, stocks of munitions and food under VC control can be seized and the military effectiveness substantially reduced.

*Air attack on N.V. military to provoke
massive Chinese intervention.*